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THE CULT OF FINALITY:
RETHINKING COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
IN THE POSTMODERN AGE'
LAuRA GASTON DOOLEY"
I. INTRODUCTION
What is a fact, and who gets to say what a fact is? These questions lurk
beneath and animate the doctrine of collateral estoppel,' or (as we modem types
say) issue preclusion, in the law of civil .procedure. But neither courts nor
scholars have faced these basic questions head-on in considering the efficacy of
a doctrine that literally exports findings of fact from one case to other unrelated
cases. Instead, discussions about collateral estoppel have focused on the
"fairness" of applying the doctrine, particularly in terms of the party to be
bound by the predetermined fact and whether it had a "full and fair" opportunity
to litigate the issue in the former suit.2 Somehow, amazingly, this area of the
law has remained analytically untouched by the epistemological upheaval that has
revolutionized (some might say scandalized) 20th century philosophy, literary
criticism and, to a great extent, jurisprudence-postmodernism.
Postmodermism is a diverse, amorphous amalgam of ideas that ricochets
sometimes wildly among academic disciplines. Its various manifestations,
though, share at least one core premise in their resolute antifoundationalism-the
notion that ideas, principles, even simple facts are not objectively fixed but
rather are constructed.3 To appropriate the famous Gertrude Stein quote about
* Copyright 1995, Laura Gaston Dooley.
- Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. My thanks to Nancy Murphy and
Quentin Burrows for excellent research assistance.
1. Collateral estoppel is a common-law doctrine that says that once a fact is determined against
a party, it may be used against that party in later, even unrelated cases. See generally 18 CHARLES
WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTIONS § 4402, at 8-11 (1981).
As I like to tell my classes, it's the "been there, done that" doctrine in civil procedure.
2. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (Supreme Court discussing
the fairness of applying collateral estoppel); Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral
Estoppel-Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957) (analysis of fairness
problems with use of collateral estoppel).
3. STANLEY FISH, And-Foundationalism, Theory Hope, and the Teaching of Composition, in
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 342, 344-45 (1989) (anti-foundationalist argument made "in a
variety of ways and in a variety of disciplines"; listing scholars espousing anti-foundationalism
across those disciplines). See also RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENSES OF PRAGMATISM at x/ii (1982):
[W]hat ties Dewey and Foucault, James and Nietzsche together [is] the sense that there
is nothing deep down inside us except what we have put there ourselves, no criterion
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Oakland-postmodernism teaches that there is no there there.
4
Legal theorists have used this anti-foundational approach to reexamine a
number of legal doctrines, most notably as part of the celebrated (and vilified)
critical legal studies movement. Though the central postmodem tenet of anti-
foundationalism has received quite widespread acceptance in the literary
community, its reception in the legal community has been mixed, to put it
mildly. Since it is most frequently applied to dismantle legal doctrines of
distinguished pedigree, reaction tends to label it radical and threatening to the
stability of the rule of law.
No matter what one thinks of the philosophical consequences of a
postmodem approach to law, its methodological value in exposing subtexts and
seemingly neutral or inevitable relationships makes employing its techniques
worthwhile. In this article I will use two postmodern approaches, post-
structuralism and neopragmatism, to rethink the doctrine of collateral estoppel
both conceptually and functionally. Part I begins by introducing briefly the
poststructuralist techniques articulated (though somewhat inaccessibly) by the
French literary theorist Jacques Derrida and later developed by legal scholars.
I then use those techniques to demonstrate the instability, first of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel in the abstract, and second of a concrete application of the
doctrine. Part II explores the teachings of the neopragmatists, especially Stanley
Fish, who has consistently demonstrated both the vulnerability of legal texts and
how fragmentary and unsatisfying conventional jurisprudence can be. In part-
icular, Fish's notion of meaning generated by "interpretive communities"5 has
important and interesting implications for our consideration of collateral
estoppel. If Fish is right that people's interpretations are inevitably shaped by
the communities with which they explicitly or implicitly identify, then the
legitimacy of exported factfinding on which collateral estoppel rests must be
reexamined in light of the relevant interpretive community. In other words,
once it is conceded that truth, and in particular, factfmding, is a product of
social construction and may not be externally measured for accuracy, then what
that we have not created in the course of creating a practice, no standard of rationality
that is not an appeal to such criterion, no rigorous argumentation that is not obedience
to our own conventions.
Id.
4. Gertrude Stein, quoted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MODERN QUOTATIONS 207 (1991).
5. Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and its Implications for Statutory
Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2505, 2544-45 (1992) (describing Fish's idea: "Each
interpretive community to which a person belongs-and one can belong to many such communities
simultaneously-unconsciously shapes the methods one employs to understand texts and the norms
that generally guide one's behavior or practices in the community."). Professor Schanck's article
provides excellent and accessible descriptions of both poststructuralism and the neo-pragmatism of
Stanley Fish.
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matters most is not whether the fact is "true" or even whether the process that
produced that fact was "fair." Instead, what matters is who gets to say what the
facts are in a particular context and whether given that context the relevant
interpretive community has had its say. This, in turn, might require different
outcomes depending on locality-what may be true in Poughkeepsie may not be
true in Peoria. 6
This is not as radical a notion as it may at first sound. We have long
acknowledged, as we must, that the factfmding process in a trial is far from
perfect,7 that the snapshot of past events captured in a trial verdict is a blurry
representation at best. So the question becomes to what extent we should
allocate the scarce trial resources available given the acknowledged lack of
authoritative factfinding. In other words, is regard for local community
standards worth the cost of relitigation?
Perhaps even more fundamentally, the application of postmodern theory to
an analysis of collateral estoppel forces us to take a look at who it is that
typically benefits by its use, and who is hurt. I take those questions up in Part
III. Interestingly, the theoretical picture can itself produce differing inter-
pretations on this question. At first glance, the doctrine of collateral estoppel
would seemingly be of great use to the one-time litigant as against the repeat
player; for example, collateral estoppel eases the burden of an individual
plaintiff who sues a large manufacturer of a product and is able to use a finding
made against that manufacturer in a case brought by an earlier plaintiff. But a
closer look might reveal that this "benefit" turns out to be somewhat illusory,
because courts have been more reticent to allow those applications of collateral
estoppel. Thus, because defensive collateral estoppel (used typically by
defendants) is now almost universally accepted as a salutary resource-saving
procedural device, while offensive collateral estoppel (used principally by
plaintiffs) is viewed more suspiciously as a windfall to the undeserving, the
relitigation burden may be falling disproportionately on those most in need of
cost-cutting procedural measures. The ironic result is, then, that socially-
constructed facts have the force of lasting truth primarily when they benefit the
powerful: the large corporation, the government, and the like. The individual
litigant, seeking to rely on prior factfinding in her favor, faces obstacles focused
6. See generally id. at 2510 ("Knowledge is thus conceived by postmodernists as always
contingent, always dependent on context, and always 'local' rather than 'universal,' as it is so often
assumed to be.").
7. Judge Jerome Frank was, of course, famously critical of the trial process as a successful
means of capturing truth. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 80, 101 (1949).
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on the "unfairness" to her opponent.8 This produces the perverse result that the
most likely beneficiaries of the doctrine of collateral estoppel are those with the
most resources, who could better afford litigation and therefore need it less.
Because the decisionmaker under our system of private dispute resolution
is either judge or jury, we must also remain sensitive to the fact that the use of
collateral estoppel will deprive the jury of its factfinding function.9 If you
believe, as I do, that the jury is in most situations the superior decisionmaker
(being more diverse demographically and more diffuse functionally), ° then we
must examine whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be used to
circumvent the power of the community to speak in given contexts, despite the
inefficiencies that "relitigation"" may entail.
I. POSTSTRUCTURALISM
Or, When is a Fact Not a Fact
A. Deconstructing Collateral Estoppel
Ferdinand de Saussure described language as a structuralist system, in
which meaning depends on the relationships among words as a complete system
of signs. Each word constitutes a sign system, consisting of the signifier-the
written or spoken mark-and the signified-the mental concept it purports to
represent. I" These signs are then organized into oppositional pairs, called
binary oppositions. 13 Thus, we understand "hot" in opposition to "cold," "up"
in opposition to "down" and so forth. Even as to those terms that do not fit
neatly into an oppositional pair, we understand their meaning by comparing the
8. The United States Supreme Court approved the potential use of offensive, nonmutual
collateral estoppel in the federal court system in Parkiane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322
(1979). But before a federal court applies the doctrine, it must consider several "fairness factors"
such as whether the plaintiff could have joined in the earlier action and whether there are prior
inconsistent verdicts on the books. The ultimate decision is left to the discretion of the trial court.
Id. at 331.
9. This will of course possibly implement the factfinding done by a previous jury, but because
the interpretive community might look quite different in different localities, its use still will thwart
the second jury's function as local community voice in the courtroom. See infra notes 69-71 and
accompanying text.
10. See generally Laura G. Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception and
Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325 (1995).
11. I put the word in quotation marks to convey my view that since meaning will fluctuate
according both to context and to differing players in the separate litigation, there never will be true
repeat litigation.
12. Schanck, supra note 5, at 2520.
13. Id. at 2521.
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reference to what it is not. 1
4
Post-structuralists, particularly Derrida, " took this linguistic paradigm and
demonstrated that not only can words, as signs, be divorced from referents in
the real world, signifiers and signifieds can be divorced from each other, thus
deferring meaning indefinitely 6 and demonstrating the impossibility of "fixing"
meaning within the confines of a linguistic unit. For example, a dictionary
definition of a word itself consists of other words which must be defined, and
so on infinitely. 7 We never reach "the thing" itself, only more words. The
gap between words and things is never bridged, only deferred.
Derrida coined the word "differance" to describe this linguistic relation.
A pun that intersects the verbs "to differ" and "to defer," the notion is that the
meaning of words is not, and in fact cannot be, determinate. 8 One commen-
tator has called this the "chicken-and-egg quality" of Derrida's thinking: 9
because words exist and can be understood only in terms of their relations with
each other, they are always both mutually dependant upon and resistant to other
words. Thus, when we think of the meaning of a word like "speech," rather
than conceptualizing that idea in isolation, we think of the word and its
opposite-"speech as opposed to writing."' Though by focusing on one
concept-speech-we privilege2' it over its opposite, we see that a "trace"'
14. This is what makes a word "diacritic"-we understand the word (even if not part of a
binary opposition) only in relation to what it is not. See 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 594
(1989) (diacritic defined as "capable or showing a capacity, of distinguishing or discerning").
15. See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976) [hereinafter DERRIDA, OF
GRAMMATOLOGY]; JACQUES DERRIDA, POSITIONS (1981) [hereinafter, DERRIDA, POSITIONS]. For
an excellent introduction to the thought of Jacques Derrida and its potential application to problems
of legal interpretation, see J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J.
743 (1987).
16. Schanck, supra note 5, at 2523.
17. Id. (citing RAMAN SELDEN, A READER'S GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY LITERARY THEORY
73 (1985)).
18. See definition of "differance" in THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF MODERN LITERARY AND
CULTURAL CRITICISM 83 (1995).
19. Balkin, supra note 15, at 752.
20. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 15, at 34-43; Balkin, supra note 15, at 753.
Deconstructing the speech/writing dichotomy has been central to the project of poststructuralism.
See also Schanck, supra note 5, at 2526.
21. Or, give it primacy. For a discussion of the concept of privileging in Derrida's thought,
see Balkin, supra note 15, at 746-47.
22. Id. at 752
The word 'trace' is a metaphor for the effect of the opposite concept, which is no longer
present but has left its mark on the concept we are now considering. The trace is what
makes deconstruction possible; by identifying the traces of the concepts in each other,
we identify their mutual conceptual dependence.
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of its opposite is necessary for us to discern what it is as opposed to what it is
not.
Deconstructionists use these ideas to demonstrate that since words can only
be understood in terms of their difference from other words, by defering to other
words, their meaning can be inverted; that is, since the "basic" term A actually
depends upon the other term B to establish its meaning, B becomes "basic" to
A.' Thus, we can perform a "deconstructive reversal" by showing that the
original term A is as dependent upon B as we have previously assumed B to
depend on A, thus making "A's privileged status . . . an illusion." The
classic illustration of such a reversal is in the philosophical problem of identity
versus difference. We privilege the notion of identity, and then define as
"different" those things that are not identical.' Yet we could never tell what
is identical without the concept of difference to define it. Thus, the terms are
mutually dependent and the notion of identity cannot be privileged.'
Meaning, then, cannot be fixed within the linguistic confines of a word
because the word is never stable. This is what deconstructionists mean when
they say that there is no "presence" of meaning in a word-there is no unifying,
transcendent meaning that is or could be unequivocally conveyed by a word or
group of words.' Moreover, since each term in opposition is necessary to
complete the other, it is a subversive presence lurking in the margins of the
word because it is capable of overthrowing the hierarchy of what we consider
paramount. Derrida calls this the "dangerous supplement":' the very thing
necessary to complete one idea has the potential to destroy it. 29
For deconstructionists, then, there can never be meaning that is always and
inalterably "present" in words, since words must be understood only through the
complex interplay of their interconnection with other words. So what does this
mean for the use of collateral estoppel in civil litigation? The doctrine of
collateral estoppel rests on the distinctly anti-(and ante-) postmodem notion that
23. Id. at 751.
24. Id. at 747.
25. This, by the way, has been a central problem of the feminist project: trying to decide
whether women should be identified with men and thus receive the same benefits, or whether they
are different and entitled to different (and ideally not inferior) treatment. Catharine MacKinnon's
work has, in a way, deconstnucted this dichotomy by rejecting the idea that women and women's
treatment should be measured by their identity with, or difference from, men. See generally
CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987).
26. Balkin, supra note 15, at 748.
27. See generally the definitions of "absence/presence" in THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF
MODERN LITERARY AND CULTURAL CRITICISM 2 (1995).
28. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 15, at 144.
29. See Balkin, supra note 15, at 758-59; Schanck, supra note 5, at 2525.
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once a fact is fixed, it would be a waste of decisionmaking resources to revisit
the factual dispute. Therefore, a fact may be exported from one case to another,
at least as against a party that was involved in the initial litigation that fixed the
fact.
This assumes that the meaning of the exported fact is somehow "present"
in the words used, such that the court in case 2 may readily discern its meaning
simply by referring to the text' produced in case 1. But the idea that there
ever can be discernible "presence" of meaning in a text or in a factual finding
is rejected by postmodern theory.
In fact, the very thing that makes language useful-what linguists call
iterability, or "the property of being able to be repeated in many different
contexts" 31-also means there can be no presence of meaning. Because "the
same property of words that allows us to express what we mean requires that we
also be able to express what we do not mean," 32 we can speak ironically, or
jokingly (as in, sure, I can't wait to go to the faculty meeting).33 Thus, the
poststructuralist approach to language has two essential insights to offer our
rethinking of the concept of collateral estoppel. First, the basic anti-foundational
worldview precludes us from believing that facts are out there to be discovered
and articulated by the factfinder at trial. Rather, they are socially constructed
by the unique confluence of the experiences and worldviews of the factfimders
and the evidence presented (which itself can be deconstructed).
Second, the indeterminacy of language prevents whatever facts are "found"
in a trial from being successfully captured in a sentence whose meaning can be
transported intact into a different case. These two insights are inextricably
bound. Once it is acknowledged that factfinding in a case is a process of
persuasion, control of information (by attorneys and judges),' and often, in the
jury room, compromise, then the seemingly neutral, bright-line statements that
emerge and are later offered for use by way of collateral estoppel begin to look
suspiciously flawed. As one scholar has observed, in reference to the
application of legal rules and doctrines:
30. This may be a case opinion, jury instructions that indicate what decisions the jury must have
reached in order to render its verdict, the record of the trial itself, etc.
31. Balkin, supra note 15, at 749.
32. Id. at 750.
33. Perhaps an old Japanese proverb best captures the key poststructuralist linguistic paradigm:
"the reverse side also has a reverse side." Cheryl Lavin, Fast Track Replays, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 21,
1996, (Sunday Magazine), at 10.
34. This happens technically through the operation of the rules of evidence, which control what
information the jury is allowed to find out.
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A text is not a pure presence that immediately and transparently
reveals a distinct meaning intended by its author. Instead, from the
standpoint of deconstruction, every writing embodies a failed attempt
at reconciling identity and difference, unity and diversity and self and
other. A writing may give the impression of having achieved the
desired reconciliation, but such impression can only be the product of
ideological distortion, suppression of difference or subordination of the
other.35
When the relevant text is "facts" that are "found" by a jury, we can see in
the margins of the statements of the facts they find the suppression of voices
who lost out in the struggle of the decisionmaking process. This concern takes
on added significance given the uneven distribution of power among the initial
decisionmakers. For example, research shows that often the dynamics of the
jury room operate to silence the voices of women and minorities.' Women
jurors have a lower participation rate in jury deliberations than their male
counterparts and are much less likely to be elected foreperson.37 This has
produced concern that the jury's product, including both the verdict and any
factual findings flowing from it, are "erroneous. "' And even apart from any
accuracy concerns, this suppression thwarts the notion of community input that
is at the heart of the jury trial institution. Thus, the initial factfinding
supposedly captured by the articulation later proposed for collateral estoppel
effect may be tainted by the suppression of some voices. Those voices may,
then, whisper only in the margins of the statement of "fact" that purportedly
establishes the truth of the matter in the later lawsuit, and this later linguistic
suppression becomes all the more troublesome.
This is not to say, of course, that courts have cavalierly ignored the
downsides of collateral estoppel, though the fundamental unease that courts
sometimes express is usually identified as a concern that the exported fact may
simply be "wrong," that is, not historically accurate. It is this concern about
exporting possible inaccuracy that gives force to Professor Brainerd Currie's
famous train wreck example39 and the exception to the application of offensive,
35. Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation: Conflict, Indeterminacy and
the Temptations of the New Legal Formalism, in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE
153 (1992).
36. See Nancy S. Marder, Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 YALE L.J. 593 (1987).
37. Id. at 595.
38. Id. at 600.
39. Professor Currie postulated a train wreck in which 50 passengers are injured. If the first
plaintiff sues and recovers by showing that the train company was negligent, then later plaintiffs
(barring otheri fairness considerations defeating the use of offensive, non-mutual collateral
estoppel-see supra note 2 and accompanying text) can theoretically use that finding in their later
suits against the train company. But if the first plaintiff sues and loses, the other plaintiffs are not
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nonmutual collateral estoppel when prior inconsistent verdicts exist on the issue
(i.e. one of them must be wrong, and we don't know which, so no collateral
estoppel effect). Moreover, courts applying collateral estoppel have shown some
sensitivity to the importance of context, and the potential unfairness of applying
the doctrine when a party's financial exposure in the first case gave little
incentive to vigorously litigate.' Indeed, the Second Restatement of Judgments
advises that collateral estoppel should not be applied when the prior judgment
was produced in a case whose circumstances differ significantly from present
ones. 41
Moreover, the very policy often cited to justify the use of collateral
estoppel-that is, the fear of inconsistent findings-gives lie to the notion that
the factfmding would otherwise be consistent and the use of collateral estoppel
is simply an efficient, time-saving device. In other words, we justify the use of
collateral estoppel because of our fear that different decisionmakers in the
context of different cases might make inconsistent findings-this is thought to be
somehow unseemly and subversive of the authority of the court system. So in
order to mask the uncertainty that inevitably flows from an imperfect system of
truthfinding, we extol the virtues of finality. Litigation must come to an end,
we say, and our cultish devotion to consistency and finality trumps even if that
means that we fossilize the imperfect trial product as "truth."
B. Deconstructing a Fixed Fact in a Given Trial Context
What all this fancy analysis42 boils down to for our purposes here is that
facts established by litigation, being as they must be captured by language which
is inherently unstable, are themselves inherently unstable (or indeterminate to
bound, since they were not parties to the first plaintiff's suit. If the first plaintiff sues and loses, as
do the next 24 plaintiffs, what happens if plaintiff #26 sues and wins? Should plaintiffs #27 through
50 get the benefit of that win by way of collateral estoppel? See Currie, supra note 2, at 281-88.
40. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 cmt. g (1982):
The circumstances attending the determination of an issue in the first action may indicate
that it could reasonably have been resolved otherwise if those circumstances were
absent. Resolution of the issue in question may have entailed reference to such matters
as the intention, knowledge,-or comparative responsibility of the parties in relation to
each other .... In these and similar situations, taking the prior determination at face
value for purposes of the second action would extend the effects of imperfections in the
adjudicative process beyond the limits of the first adjudication, within which they aire
accepted only because of the practical necessity of achieving finality.
Id.
42. "If it is true that there are but two kinds of people in the world-the logical positivists and
the god-damned English professors-then I suppose I am a logical positivist." C. GLYMOUR,
THEORY AND EVIDENCE ix (1980), quoted in Dale Jamieson, The Poverty of Postmodemist Thought,
62 U. COLO. L. REv. 577, 594 n.54 (1991).
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use the more CLS-ey term).43 Thus, even assuming that we could come up
with a coherent justification for exporting factfmding to different contexts
(based, probably, on the marginal value of repeating costly litigation versus the
efficiency produced by applying collateral estoppel), we would still be left with
the problem of indeterminacy in the language, producing potential interpretive
problems that may dwarf the costs of simply repeating the litigation.
Let's try to test this by using a finding in commonplace civil litigation.
We'll call this the Dooley chainsaw massacre, for reasons that will, I hope,
become clear. Chainsaws are, I am sure we can agree, potentially dangerous
tools. Purchasers of chainsaws are sometimes injured by their use. The
purchaser who believes that negligent design of the chainsaw is the cause of his
accident may choose to sue the manufacterer, or the retailer from whom he
bought the chainsaw, or the regional distributor, and so on." A key issue in
such litigation, one usually decided by a jury as factfinder, will be whether the
chainsaw in its design is unreasonably dangerous.5 On the surface, it would
seem that this finding should not vary from context to context, assuming that the
same model is involved in multiple litigation. But what would a deconstruction-
ist say about the statement "Dooley Chainsaw Model X is an unreasonably
dangerous product"?
The deconstructionist would identify the binary oppositions that undergird
this finding of fact and conclude that there are at least two: first, the word
dangerous is understood only in relation to its binary opposite, safe. And
second, the word unreasonable is opposed, obviously, to reasonable, here
probably understood as an articulation of an acceptable/unacceptable dichotomy.
43. See Schanck, supra note 5, at 2528 (these are unstable, no matter how strong the impulse
to fix them).
44. Unfortunately, these accidents are not only hypothetical. See, e.g., Clemenz v. Sears
Roebuck& Co., 986 F.2d 1426 (10th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff injured while operating a tablesaw when
it "kicked back"); Cates v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 928 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1991) (consumer lost
three fingers due to the alleged kickback of a radial arm saw); Deviner v. Electrolux Motor, AB,
844 F.2d 769 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (employee injured when chainsaw kicked back and cut the top of his
right wrist); Vogt v. Emerson Elec. Co., 805 F. Supp. 506 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) (radial arm saw
buyer was injured when he caught his hand in a saw); Sargia v. Skil Corp., No. 84 Civ. 7107, 1985
WL 5126 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1985) (plaintiff sought damages for the loss of the tip of his index
finger allegedly due to design defect in circular power saw); Albanese v. Emerson Elec. Co., 552
F. Supp. 694 (D. Del. 1982) (worker brought action against chainsaw manufacturer for kickback
that resulted in serious injuries to his right forearm); Perkins v. Emerson Elec. Co., 482 F. Supp.
1347 (W.D. La. 1980) (woodcutter brought action against manufacturer of chainsaw for injuries
sustained when the chainsaw kicked back); Elliott v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 527 N.E.2d 574 (IIl.
App. Ct. 1988) (purchaser of radial saw brought action against retailer and manufacturer of saw that
kicked back while purchaser was using it to cut wood).
45. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A for the elements plaintiffs must prove to make out
a products liability claim.
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Taking first the safe/dangerous dichotomy, the deconstructionist would note that
safe is the privileged concept, the one that we consider the "standard" to which
we aspire. But no product is completely safe, of course, as evidenced by the
freak accidents with exploding soda cans and the like that year after year thrill
and bewilder tort students across the country. There is always danger lurking
in everything we consider to be safe.' And conversely, seemingly dangerous
things, like chainsaws, can be and routinely are used safely, and serve useful
and necessary purposes for consumers. Thus, a jury determination that a
particular chainsaw model is dangerous does not necessarily mean that it cannot
be safely used; its potential safety lurks in the trace of the concept presumably
captured by the word dangerous. Instead, that determination reflects something
of a linguistic compromise: the events depicted in that trial (a horrific accident,
say) led the decisionmaking jury, constrained as it was by the zero-sum-game
structure of the verdict-reaching process, to say that the product was
dangerous.
The "unreasonably" part of the text presents a similar problem. In fact,
that word might initially seem to serve the function in the sentence of parsing
the very difficulty that is produced by the dangerous/safe dichotomy: to say that
something is unreasonably dangerous certainly implies that we sometimes accept
a certain level of danger as reasonable. But reasonableness is a quintessentially
fuzzy word, maybe especially for those of us who study law. Reasonableness
is purportedly some kind of standard having some kind of objective content.
Thus, in tort law one encounters the mythical "reasonable man," the more
modem "reasonable woman" (apparently such a creature didn't always exist),
and in our egalitarian times the "reasonable person." But most of us would
readily acknowledge, I think, that what is reasonable is whatever those who have
decisionmaking power say is reasonable. In other words, rather than holding
a litigant's conduct to the supposedly objective standard, a decisionmaker is
simply deciding whether the conduct is acceptable, then labeling it reasonable,
or unacceptable, which then carries the "unreasonable" label. This, by the way,
is not to say that the decisionmaker is failing at its assigned task; a post-
modernist would say that the decisionmaker is simply doing the best that it can
do given its inability to transcend its own ideological biases. '
46. One is reminded of the "undertoad" of John Irving's novel The World According to Garp:
when Garp's children play in the seemingly placid surf they are warned to "beware the
undertoad"-the actual and metaphorical danger that always lurks beneath the surface.
47. See Laura G. Dooley, Sounds of Silence on the Civil Jury, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 405 (1991)
(arguing that the zero-sum-game structure of the civil jury trial-if defendant wins, plaintiff must
lose-suppresses the voices of some jurors).
48. In asbestos litigation, the issue of whether asbestos is a dangerous product is one that
repeats from case to case. When plaintiffs attempted to use offensive, nonmutual collateral estoppel
against manufacturers to foreclose relitigation of that issue, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the attempt, noting that "this Court certainly did not decide [in a prior asbestos case] that
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This linguistic problem is more acute as to findings that involve applying
law to fact. Although a deconstructionist could, no doubt, perform this
postmodern operation on a mundane evidentiary fact like "Defendant ran the red
light" or even "Plaintiff was wearing a green coat," I will not attempt to take
my argument that far.49 Findings that involve the application of law to fact,
like the dangerousness of a product, or whether particular conduct constitutes
negligence, are the sorts of facts that are most vigorously asserted as a basis for
collateral estoppel effect, and have the most direct impact on the subsequent
litigation. If it does seem less troubling to "fix" evidentiary-type facts, it can
be at least partially explained by citing to what appears to be broader societal
consensus as to shared understandings of words like "red light" than there is as
to words like "unreasonably dangerous."
Leading scholars like Cass Sunstein have criticized deconstruction as a tool
for legal theory by arguing that it ignores such consensus: "Deconstruction with
the law [which] amounts in practice to quite ordinary efforts at undermining a
particular line of reasoning, is inadequate in large part because it fails to account
for interpretive norms and criteria. In law and elsewhere, texts have relatively
fixed meanings because of shared interpretive principles."' The problem with
collateral estoppel, though, is that when facts are "fixed" by this doctrine, we
cannot be sure of interpretive norms like those that pervade the legal profession.
The typical factfinder, the civil jury, is non-repeating, and even if it were the
same, the facts are constructed, by definition, in different contexts. Unless it
can be said that all people (not just lawyers) share interpretive principles such
that juries could predictably reach the same result via factf'mding as collateral
estoppel produces, a notion belied by our fear of inconsistent verdicts that
justifies the doctrine, then the doctrine is, inevitably, an arbitrary attempt at
fixture of something that refuses to be static.
11. INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES IN THE COURTROOM
In exporting his literary theory to legal contexts, Stanley Fish has
relentlessly, and some would argue more consistently than anyone else,5 pressed
every jury presented with the same facts would be compelled to reach the conclusion reached by the
Borel jury: that asbestos was unreasonably dangerous. Such a holding would have been not only
unnecessary, it would also have been unwarranted." Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d
334 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182, 1188 (5th Cir. 1981)).
49. For an interesting deconstructive operation on the seemingly straightforward constitutional
provision requiring that a president of the United States be at least thirty-five years old, see Schanck,
supra note 5, at 2528-32.
50. Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405, 463
n.216 (1989).
51. Schanck, supra note 5, at 2530.
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the anti-foundationalism that undergirds his theory about the construction of
meaning.
Anti-foundationalism teaches that questions of fact, truth, correctness,
validity, and clarity can neither be posed nor answered in reference to
some extracontextual, ahistorical, nonsituational reality, or rule, or
law, or value; rather, anti-foundationalism asserts, all of these matters
are intelligible and debatable only within the precincts of the contexts
or situations or paradigms or communities that give them their local
and changeable shape.5 2
According to Fish, then, when conditions behind a word change, because it is
iterable in different contexts, its meaning changes: "[AIll texts are equally and
radically orphaned in the sense that no one of them is securely fastened to an
independently specifiable state of affairs. 5 3 Moreover, facts that seem to us
static and impervious to challenge are illusions:
[U]nassailable facts are unassailable only because an act of persuasion
has been so successful that it is no longer regarded as one, and instead
has the status of a simple assertion about the world. In short, there
are no facts that are not the product of persuasion, and therefore no
facts that stand to the side of its operations; all agreements are the
result of the process . . . and therefore no agreement, however
securely based it may seem for the moment, is invulnerable to
challenge. s'
To the extent that interpretations seem to achieve some sort of constancy, Fish
attributes that to the phenomenon of shared interpretive constraints that operate
within particular communities, which Fish calls "interpretive communities."55
People do not (cannot) choose to join particular interpretive communities; rather,
these communities shape the consciousness (ideology) of people who become,
as it were "community property.
" 5
This Fishian (Fish-like, Fish-esque, maybe just Fish-y) view of the world
is not just a fancier way of saying that subjectivity defines truth. Fish's
52. FISH, supra note 3, at 344.
53. STANLEY FISH, With the Compliments of the Author: Reflections on Austin and Derrida,
in DOING WHAT COMEs NATURALLY 37, 44 (1989).
54. STANLEY FISH, Short People Got No Reason to Live: Reading Irony, in DOING WHAT
COMES NATURALLY 194 (1989).
55. STANLEY FISH, Introduction: Going Down the Anti-Formalist Road, in DOING WHAT
COMES NATURALLY 1, 30 (1989). See also Schanck, supra note 5, at 2544.
56. STANLEY FISH, Change, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 141, 141 (1989).
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interpreter is not free to simply choose an interpretation she likes best; she is
constrained by the conventions of her interpretive community. If factfinding is
a process of interpretation, if Fish is right that facts are constructed, then what
matters is who gets the final say about what the facts are. As another scholar
puts it, "[i]n postmodern thought . .. the community plays an indispensable
role. It is the community that must decide when to take anomalous facts
seriously . . . . [LIanguage and the search for knowledge are communal
achievements. "57
Furthermore, proponents of postmodern hermeneutics, 58 most importantly
Hans-Georg Gadamer, make a corresponding claim about the process of
interpretation, which of course is what judges must do when they apply
collateral estoppel. To apply a previously-decided fact in subsequent litigation,
a judge must, explicitly or implicitly, perform an interpretive action on the text
that purports to capture that fact. But because of the instability of language, and
the impossibility of any person, including (especially?) a judge, extracting
himself from his own interpretive community, the interpretive act itself creates
meaning. Gadamer teaches that the hermeneutic act is "one unified process" 9
involving understanding, interpretation and application.'m This is not to say
that the judge applying collateral estoppel will arbitrarily or subjectively attach
meaning to the "text" of the fact. The judge himself or herself is constrained
by the tradition of his or her own interpretive community, and reaffirms and
recreates that tradition by each interpretive act that he or she performs.
So, then, if the truth fixed by collateral estoppel is a manifestation of the
interpretive tradition ofjudges, why is that any more difficult a problem than the
longstanding and still-heated debate about legal hermeneutics in general (like the
one between Dworkin and Fish6 or Fiss and Fish6 2 or just about everyone
else and Fish).' Here's why: we assign legal interpretation tasks to judges
57. Nancey Murphy, Scientfic Realism and Postmodern Philosophy, 41 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI.
291, 295 (1990).
58. An excellent description of this strand of postmodernism can be found in Stephen M.
Feldman, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship and Judicial Practice (With an
Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in Habeas Corpus Cases), 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
1046, 1060-65 (1994).
59. HANS-GEORO GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD at 308 (1989), quoted in Feldman, supra
note 58, at 1064.
60. Id.
61. See STANLEY FISH, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, in
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 87 (1989) (Fish's reply to Ronald Dworkin's essay Law as
Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1982)).
62. See STANLEY FISH, Fish v. Fiss, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 120 (1989)
(responding to Owen Fiss's essay Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982)).
63. See also STANLEY FISH, Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and
Literature, in DOINO WHAT COMES NATURALLY 294 (1989).
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in our dispute resolution system. It is their job to figure out what the precedent
is, what it means, and whether and how to apply it. But the traditional
distribution of power in our system assigns factfinding tasks to juries, a one-time
established interpretive community for each case, on the assumption that general
community values are most directly given force through that institution. To the
extent that collateral estoppel allows a judge to usurp the jury's traditional role,
we get a much more limited interpretive community represented, and no doubt
a more elitist one at that."
Thus, the seemingly simple task of applying a fact already found is
disturbingly vulnerable to interpretive difficulties. But this strain of postmodern
thinking helps to uncover yet another concern about applying collateral estoppel.
Once a fact has achieved a certain pedigree (actually litigated, decided and
necessary to the judgment),6 then it will be treated as a done deal in
subsequent litigation as against someone who was a party to the prior suit. But
treating it as a done deal is a way of crystallizing into "truth" what was simply
an interpretative act of the initial factfinder. The fact was negotiated, not found,
the product of superior persuasion in a particular context,' a social
construction.
This insight has important implications for those who are concerned about
decisionmaking power and how it is allocated. In civil litigation, there are two
possible decisiomakers-judge and jury. The use of collateral estoppel thwarts
the decisionmaking power in the second suit of whoever-judge or jury-would
otherwise be charged with the task of establishing the facts.
There are four possible scenarios to consider here. First, the decision-
maker in suit 1 whose finding is to be applied in suit 2 may have been a judge.
That judge was a microcosm of the interpretive communities to which he
belongs, and whatever factual findings he arrived at are, consciously or not, a
product of that. Let's assume that this judge was, as most actually are,67 a
white middle-aged man.
64. See Dooley, supra note 10 (noting the declining power of the civil jury as its demographic
diversification increased).
65. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.11 (2d ed. 1993) (outlining essential
prerequisites for applying collateral estoppel).
66. See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT 61 (1985) (stating that the finding of
dangerousness in the first litigated asbestos case was a product of jury compromise).
67. See Carl Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap on the Federal Courts, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1237
(1993). See also COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 6 (Hillary Rodham Clinton, Chair, 1988) (noting
that as of 1988, only 7.4% of the federal judiciary and 7.2 % of state judges were women).
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Now a second suit arises in which a finding from that previous case may
be applied by way of collateral estoppel. This second suit, let's say, is pending
in a court presided over by an African-American, youngish, female judge,
without a jury. Absent collateral estoppel, this second judge would be required
to make findings of fact.' Would the interpretive communities to which the
second judge belongs lead her to interpret the evidence precisely as the previous
judge did? If not, or even maybe not, then we must ask whether the application
of collateral estoppel will serve to fossilize a version of truth out of sync with
the relevant interpretive community.
The problem is perhaps even more acute if, in the second scenario, we
imagine that the decisionmaker to be used in the second suit is a jury. One of
the long-esteemed features of the jury system is that it brings to bear the
interpretive faculties of twelve people, rather than just one. To the extent that
collateral estoppel fixes a fact such that it is removed from jury consideration,
that communal perspective is lost.
What if the initial decisionmaker was a jury? For the third scenario, let's
suppose that both suits are jury cases. Applying collateral estoppel, then, will
substitute the factual constructions made by the first jury for those that would
be made by the second. Though this may, in theory, vindicate the jury system,
it still poses dangers to local community interpretation, 69 with the local
generation of meaning central to postmodernist thought. Moreover, in terms of
the legitimacy of the factfinding, the jury from case 1 has authority
(governmental, and in a sense contractual, since the parties agree to abide
ultimately by the court's decision) to construct facts for case 1. It does not have
authority to construct facts for case 2-authority for that is vested in judge/jury
2.
And for the final scenario, assume that a judge who will be the factfinder
in suit 2 is considering applying collateral estoppel to use facts found by a jury
in the earlier suit. In this scenario, collateral estoppel will produce the
seemingly salutary result that a jury-mediated fact will be given truth status in
a later case, preventing the judge from substituting his or her own individual
judgment. But remember Gadamer's interpretive circle-the judge's interpret-
ation may alter the intended meaning of the fact. And even if that seems less
68. Note also the difference in standards of review: the decision whether to apply collateral
estoppel is an issue of law and the appellate court will evaluate the trial court's ruling de novo. But
a trial court's finding of fact is given more deference and only overturned if "clearly erroneous."
See generally FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 65, § 13.4, at 603-04.
69. For postmodernists, the construction of meaning is quintessentially local. See, e.g., FISH,
supra note 3, at 344 (matters of fact and truth "are intelligible and debatable only within the
precincts of the contexts... or communities that give them their local and changeable shape").
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troublesome than a wholesale substitution of judge-found facts for the prior jury-
found facts, again locality is an issue: since both judges and juries are drawn
typically from the immediate vicinity of courts, the earlier finding may have
been made in a different local context. 7° Moreover, in this, as in the other
three scenarios, the decisionmaker chosen by the parties (or at least by the
plaintiff, who typically chooses the forum) in the second suit is losing authority
to the decisionmaker in the first suit.7
Thus, our postmodern analysis has uncovered a host of potential issues that
should concern us with regard to the idea of exporting factfinding. First, there
is the linguistic difficulty. Facts that are found must be articulated. But because
language bears the vulnerability of instability, efforts to capture facts in language
are unsatisfying. And even if they could be so captured, even if we were
satisfied that the meaning of words could be fixed such that later users would
unequivocally discern their meaning, we have a further problem. The facts
found are themselves social constructions, the product of whatever interpretive
biases the decisionmaker brought to bear on his or her (or its) task. And to the
extent that the decisionmaker in the later suit may hail from different interpretive
communities, then those voices will not be heard because of the operation of
collateral estoppel.
III. WHO BEARS THE COST OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL?
Exposing this inherent instability in both the conceptual foundation of
collateral estoppel and its application might lead us to question whether its use
is arbitrary. In other words, if facts found in prior proceedings are inherently
unstable both as to their initial formation and as to their articulation, then we
must examine what possible benefits flow from artificially fixing those facts.
And perhaps even more importantly, we must examine who benefits from this
purported fixity.
70. Postmodernism teaches that all factfinding, no matter who the decisionmaker,judge or jury,
will be locally shaped and changeable. Id.
71. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). In Parklane Hosiery, the Supreme
Court considered and rejected the claim that the use of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel
defeated the defendant's right to a jury trial. The first case, which produced the findings later
offered for collateral estoppel, was judge-tried because it was an enforcement action brought by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The defendant argued in the second case that because it had
a right to a jury in that action, the Seventh Amendment precluded the use of collateral estoppel. A
majority of the Supreme Court disagreed, noting that "many procedural devices developed since [the
passage of the Seventh Amendment] have diminished the civil jury's historic domain [and] been
found not to be inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment." Id. at 336. This provoked a sharp
dissent from Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 337-56 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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The benefit of collateral estoppel is commonly said to be that the precious
limited resource of court time should not be squandered by redoing what has
been done before. This is the "been there, done that" rationale. The
beneficiaries are said to be both the parties, who are saved the cost of
relitigation, and the publicly-financed court system, which can focus its attention
on other pressing matters.' Interestingly, though, the application of collateral
estoppel has never been automatic, even when its essential elements are met.
Instead, it is said to be a "discretionary" doctrine, and judges can and do refuse
to apply it based on so-called "fairness" or "justice" concerns.
Traditionally, collateral estoppel could only be invoked by someone who
was a party to the prior action in which the finding was made. This rule,
known as the rule of mutuality," had a satisfying symmetry to it: you could
only benefit from prior factfinding if you would have been bound had the prior
finding gone against you. In 1942, Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court wrote a groundbreaking decision rejecting the mutuality rule for the first
time, saying that "no satisfactory rationalization has been advanced" for it. 74
Instead, Traynor said, collateral estoppel could properly be applied as long as
the party against whom it is used was a party to the prior litigation.
Courts slowly began to follow California's lead in abandoning the mutuality
rule, but another distinction developed-the distinction between defensive and
offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel.75 When collateral estoppel was
invoked by someone defending on a claim, it was thought to serve the salutary
purpose of preventing a plaintiff from getting more than one bite at the apple.
For example, imagine that a purchaser of a chainsaw is injured by its use, sues
the manufacturer and loses on the issue of the dangerousness of the product.
The purchaser then sues the retailer who sold him the chainsaw (as tort law
authorizes him to do). The retailer can invoke collateral estoppel to preclude the
purchaser from relitigating the issue of the product's dangerousness since that
issue was decided against the purchaser in the prior lawsuit. In the ubiquitous
metaphorical phrase, the purchaser cannot get two bites at the apple by suing
these defendants separately; he is bound by the factfinding against him in the
first case.
Offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel, by contrast, is used by someone
pursuing a claim against a party who has lost a previous case brought by
someone else. For example, imagine that our chainsaw plaintiff won his case
72. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 65, at 660.
73. See id. at 688 ("[m]utuality is premised on the notion that all litigants should be treated
equally, that no person should benefit from a judgment when he stood to lose nothing by it").
74. Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
75. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 65, at 690-91.
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against the manufacturer, with the court making a specific finding that the
chainsaw is an unreasonably dangerous product. A later plaintiff now sues the
chainsaw manufacturer and seeks to prevent the manufacturer from relitigating
the issue of the dangerousness of the same product.
Since the demise of the mutuality rule, courts have been much more reticent
to allow collateral estoppel to be used offensively than defensively.76 For
example, in the federal court system, the United States Supreme Court approved
the use of defensive nonmutual collateral estoppel in 1971, against a patent
holder who kept suing alleged infringers despite the fact that its patent had been
declared invalid in previous litigation.' Eight years later, the Court considered
the propriety of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel, in a case involving
private citizens who wished to use a prior finding of liability obtained by the
Securities and Exchange Commission against a company.' s  The Court
concluded that because offensive use did not "promote judicial economy in the
same manner as defensive use" does, and because it "may be unfair to a
defendant,"' trial courts must have "broad discretion to determine when it
should be applied. "' Courts are to consider factors such as whether plaintiffs
adopted a "wait and see" attitude, trying to take advantage of prior litigation,
whether defendants had sufficient incentive to litigate vigorously in the earlier
case and could have foreseen the later use of factfinding against them, and
whether prior judgments reached inconsistent results on the issue to be
precluded.8"
By requiring that these "fairness" factors be considered before courts apply
offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel, the Court sent a message that this type
of collateral estoppel should be harder to invoke than its defensive
counterpart.' And that in fact seems to be what has happened in the lower
courts: defensive nonmutual collateral estoppel is more routinely allowed than
76. Id. See also E. H. Schopler, Mutuality of Estoppel as Prerequisite of Availability of
Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to a Stranger to the Judgment, 31 A.L.R. 3D 1044, 1072 ("The
courts are more inclined to permit the defensive, than the offensive, use of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.").
77. Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of 11. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
78. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
79. Id. at 329-30.
80. Id. at 331.
81. Id. at 330-31.
82. See Steven C. Malin, Collateral Estoppel: The Fairness Exception, 53 J. AIR L. & COM.
959, 975-76 (1988) (The Supreme Court "expressly recognized the difference between the two types
of preclusion and created a stricter rule for offensive cases.').
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offensive, nonmutual collateral estoppel. s3  In fact, some state courts
abandoned the mutuality rule as to defensive, but not offensive collateral
estoppel."
So what does this mean for evaluating how the costs and benefits of
collateral estoppel are distributed? First, individuals are much more likely to
enter the litigation arena as plaintiffs; and though far from universal, defendants
are much more likely to be corporations or, maybe, the government. As to the
government, there is no speculating as to the outcome of the collateral estoppel
question: the Supreme Court has held that offensive nonmutual collateral
estoppel may never be used against the federal government.85
Thus, if the paradigm case involves an individual plaintiff suing a corporate
or governmental defendant, then the rules imposing a premium on the offensive
use of collateral estoppel tend to hurt the individual plaintiff-who is more likely
the party with fewer litigational resources. To put it in concrete terms, imagine
again our chainsaw plaintiff. We have seen that the finding that the chainsaw
is or is not unreasonably dangerous is inherently unstable, that it is a social
construction produced by the interpretive communities represented by the prior
decisionmaker, and that even the sentence purporting to capture the fact of
dangerousness itself may be deconstructed.
Yet maybe we have decided that, despite the instability of the factfmding,
we have put enough resources into determining the fact of dangerousness, and
we cannot afford further litigation on the point. We choose to live with the
possibility that exporting that factfmding to a second case will fossilize
something that defies fixture, and is in a sense not truth, but is the best we can
83. Indeed, an informal survey of the reported federal cases on WESTLAW decided during the
1990s seems to point to a significant discrepancy in the relative availability of offensive versus
defensive collateral estoppel. Of 40 reported cases involving the proposed use of offensive collateral
estoppel, the use was denied in 25 cases and allowed in 15, for an allowance percentage of 37.5 %.
In defensive collateral estoppel cases, the court denied use in 22 of 53 cases, for an allowance
percentage of 58%.
84. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 65, at 690-91 (New Jersey, Massachusetts, Ohio, Illinois,
Missouri). See also Malin, supra note 82, at 969. In those states that have abandoned mutuality
for both offensive and defensive use of collateral estoppel, the approval of offensive use typically
came much later. Arizona, for example, allowed defensive collateral estoppel as early as 1965, but
did not allow offensive use until 1986. See Lisa Glow, Note, Offensive Collateral Estoppel in
Arizona: Fair Litigation vs. Judicial Economy, 30 ARIz. L. REV. 535, 536 (1988). Some states
follow the federal practice of imposing "fairness" barriers to the the use of offensive, but not
defensive, collateral estoppel. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 65, at 693.
85. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984). The rationale is that since the government
litigates issues with national repercussions, offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel might artificially
"freeze" one decision with far-reaching implications, forcing the government to appeal each to the
Supreme Court.
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do to get to the truth. That is the cost of conserving resources, of affording
some finality, of getting on to other important questions. That is the cost of
collateral estoppel. So perhaps we, like most courts, will not suffer many
qualms when we tell the plaintiff chainsaw purchaser that he cannot relitigate the
issue of dangerousness against the retailer after losing it in his suit against the
manufacturer. Sorry, buddy, no two bites at the apple, we say.
But what if our chainsaw purchaser wins on the dangerousness issue against
the manufacturer? If another purchaser of the same model chainsaw suffers an
accident and sues the manufacturer, will the court allow that purchaser to use
the factfmding on dangerousness? In some states, the court cannot even
consider the possibility." In most, as in the federal system, the court must
conduct painstaking inquiry into whether this plaintiff is trying to take unseemly
advantage of the prior win of the stranger, whether the manufacturer had
adequate incentive to vigorously litigate the first suit, and so on.' Thus, an
inequity is built into the distinction between offensive and defensive collateral
estoppel; we are more willing to give truth status to the factfinding that benefits
the relatively more powerful litigant.
IV. CONCLUSION-SOME FINAL THOUGHTS ABOUT FINALrrY
The urge to "fix" things, to capture reality, to know the truth is a strongly
seductive one for all of us. The idea of achieving some sort of stability, of
settling down, appeals at a very basic level. But it is important, always, to ask
at what cost finality is achieved. Ifideed, we have seen many seemingly
intractable categories break down in recent years, and often for the better.
Fixed notions of gender, race, class, and so on have been deconstructing,' and
though that breakdown often causes cultural unease in the short term, it may
ultimately produce greater human fulfillment in the long term.
In the law, postmodern theory has been both a boon and a bust, a blessing
and a curse.' Exposing the instability of texts that we hold in high esteem
(like, say, the Constitution) both liberates those who are interested in positive
social change and frightens those who worry about an amoral, groundless
society. And it seems to me that there are traces of, dare I say it, truth in both
views. Perhaps postmodern theory is itself a dangerous supplement to our
86. See supra note 84.
87. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979).
88. See generally Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-
Modem Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296.
89. As one commentator puts it, "As a way of reading texts, it can be liberating. As a
philosophy, forget it." Dale Jamieson, The Poverty of Postmodemist Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV.
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worldview. But as thinkers like Gadamer have urged, we must be relentless in
our questioning: not only must we question our premises, we must also question
our questions. Finality, then, becomes an elusive, as well as ephemeral, goal.
In any event, it seems to me that this analysis requires us to confront head-
on the costs of our efforts to fix reality, here in particular through collateral
estoppel. We have seen that collateral estoppel artificially fixes as true a finding
that simply represents the ideologically-determined interpretation of an initial
factflnder, purportedly captured in unstable language. This, in turn, forces us
into a reexamination of the costs and benefits of this practice in a world with
admittedly scarce decisionmaking resources.
We must remain vigilant to ensure that we not become so enamored with
the ideas of consistency and efficiency that we fail to notice the potential damage
done. Our cult-like devotion to finality is dangerous if it prevents us from
considering the litigation interests of those with the least access to other means
of power.
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